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The Market for Lemons in Serial Entrepreneurship: A Commentary 
 
In their study “The Market for Lemons in Serial Entrepreneurship: Exploring Type I 
and Type II Errors in the Restart Decision”, Nielsen and Sarasvathy (henceforth N&S) 
address an important question with implications for both individual and societal wealth. What 
they ask is “Do ‘the right’ people choose to re-enter entrepreneurship after initial failure or 
success, or is there a risk that those who ‘ought to’ start another business refrain from doing 
so (Type I error) while those who had better refrain from it tend to try again (Type II error)?” 
They thereby highlight selection effects in the study or serial entrepreneurship, which if 
neglected can distort conclusions about learning from experience and its influence on future 
performance. They also highlight the possibility of “under confidence” whereas much 
entrepreneurship research has only considered the effects of possible over confidence. While 
they are not the very first to discuss either (cf. Chen 2013; Frey & Heggli 1989; Jovanovic 
1982) they bring the tenets together in an interesting way and explore their ideas using high 
quality, longitudinal data from a linked employer-employee data set.  
Based on mixed results on the performance of serial entrepreneurs I have long 
suspected that some serial entrepreneurs are “unskilled and unaware of it” (Kruger & 
Dunning 1999) rather than self-aware professionals able to draw the right lessons from their 
experiences (cf. Davidsson, 2016: 199). Consequently, I find N&S’ results—which provide 
evidence of both types of errors—suggestive and plausible. Importantly, N&S elevate their 
contribution by likening the situation to the “Market for Lemons” problem (Akerlof 1970) 
and provide an insightful discussion about the possible mechanisms and implications of 
adverse selection into entrepreneurial re-entry, as well as possible remedies. At present I 
would say this discussion is highly speculative and that the evidence of pervasive adverse 
selection in this domain is not yet strong enough to act on. However, the piece is a fine 
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example of “exploratory empirical research of management and organizational phenomena 
that our theories do not adequately explain” as highlighted in AMD’s mission. It offers an 
interesting direction for further theorizing and provides a strong stimulus towards additional 
empirical investigation.      
No research is perfect, so N&S’ study also has its limitations. As inspiration and food 
for thought for future contributors it may be worth highlighting some of these limitations 
here. Entrepreneurship researchers do not always take as much care as they should in the 
selection and conceptual labelling of their dependent variable. N&S work is uneven in this 
regard. In the front end review of the literature they mix prior research on entry, performance, 
and re-entry—all of which are relevant to their research—without sufficient distinction, 
which may portray the conclusions from prior research as more varied and confusing than 
they are. In discussing their own empirical study, N&S show awareness that firm closure may 
be voluntary and associated with financial success and that survival sometimes reflects 
foolhardy persistence rather than superior performance (Gimeno et al. 1997; Headd 2003; 
Wennberg et al. 2010), and they make some empirical adjustments based on these insights. 
However, in the main they interpret their analysis as if they are contrasting success with 
failure, which may not be entirely justified. 
Empirically their Danish data suggest a survival rate that is lower (45 percent over three 
years; Table 1) than what has been reported based on high quality data from neighboring 
Sweden and Finland (55-68 percent and increasing over time, cf. Hyytinen, Pajarinen & 
Rouvinen 2015; Tillväxtanalys 2013). This does not necessarily bias the results in favor of 
N&S’ interpretations—it might do just the opposite—but suggests that future contributors 
should be alert to the potential influence of over reporting of firm closure and re-entry as well 
as possible cohort- or period effects. More broadly, future contributors can try to achieve 
stronger justification for the success vs. failure dichotomization and/or find other ways to 
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better align conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent variable. Among other 
things, this involves paying close attention to issues of level and stage of development (cf. 
Davidsson, 2016, ch. 7). 
Another cause for concern is whether N&S always make the most relevant 
comparisons. It may have conceptual and technical advantages for some purposes to include 
second entry of both those whose first venture has survived and those who have discontinued 
it. However, N&S’ argument draws a lot on the fact that the latter are more likely to “re-
enter”. Non-researchers would hardly be surprised to find this to be the case. To take another 
car metaphor, which individuals would be more likely to buy a second car within X years, 
those whose first car was wrecked or those whose first car is still running? More seriously, 
are we comparing instances of the same phenomenon when contrasting those classes of 
repeat founders? For one thing, the second entry by “parallel” founders has implications for 
how much of their resources can be invested in either venture, and this must somehow be 
accounted for in analysis and interpretations. It is not clear that N&S do this to the full.     
Further, the Type II error status of those who discontinued their first business rests on a 
comparison with those who restart without previous firm closure. Would not a comparison 
with “failed” entrepreneurs who do not re-start be more relevant? If they do poorly in the job 
market, taking the risk of a second venture may still be the preferable choice. N&S use data 
on the wealth development of the individuals for other purposes; they could have used them 
also to back up their “Type II error” interpretation.  
N&S should be lauded for discussing the actual magnitude of their estimated effects and 
not just their statistical significance. However, they seem to use statistical significance as 
their decision rule for interpreting an effect at all. As the constant misuse of statistical 
significance in business research (and beyond) is one of my pet peeves I cannot refrain from 
pointing out that since N&S use population data their coefficients are the population 
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parameters and not statistically uncertain estimates thereof. If they are incorrect it is because 
of errors in measurement or model specification; there is no random error arising from 
sampling or assignment and the statistical inference apparatus should therefore have no role 
in this type of research (cf. Davidsson, 2016, ch. 9).  
Beyond confirmation that the Type I and Type II re-entry errors N&S observe are present 
also in other data sets, the most obvious extension of their research would be to provide 
further refinement and direct empirical evidence pertaining to the mechanisms behind these 
errors. As N&S’ interpretations rely heavily on effects of unmeasured causal attributions a 
first port of call here would be to obtain empirical data that capture causal attributions 
directly. This said, there may also be other mechanisms, psychological or otherwise, whose 
role in producing the patterns observed in N&S’ data deserve investigation.  
The above points show that N&S’ work has opened up promising avenues for future 
research on the important question that they addressed. Their work is a fine example of one 
type of scholarship—well considered theorizing based on exploratory analysis of good data—
that is important but has long been undervalued in our scholarly community (cf. Hambrick 
2007). That theorizing based on the comfort of an armchair alone is somehow superior to 
theorizing based on both armchair and data is an exceedingly odd idea. We therefore have 
reason to be grateful that Academy of Management Discoveries gives voice and a platform for 
other important forms of scholarship than those emphasized by other leading journals. N&S 
article is an excellent case in point.  
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